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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to a plea agreement, thirty-year-old Matthew Allen McKnight pleaded
guilty to felony possession of a stolen vehicle, and to felony grand theft in separate
cases.

Mr. McKnight subsequently filed motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in both

cases, which the district court denied.

The district court, in each case, imposed a

concurrent unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed.
In this consolidated appeal, Mr. McKnight asserts that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Coeur d'Alene Police Department officers responded to a report of a suspicious,
wanted male. (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) 1 One of the officers saw a
male ducking into a gray Toyota Camry parked on the street. (PSI, p.3.) The male was
identified as the wanted male, Mr. McKnight. (PSI, p.3.) The officers recognized that
the plates of the car, and the car itself, had both been reported stolen.

(PSI, p.3.)

Mr. McKnight's girlfriend Tanna Minegar, who had been sitting on a nearby porch,
denied that the vehicle or plates had been stolen. (PSI, p.3.) She stated that she and
Mr. McKnight were homeless and had been living out of the car. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. McKnight reportedly told the officers he had purchased the car for
Ms. Minegar from someone in Spokane. (PSI, p.3.) He stated that he had a bill of sale
and registration for the car in the glove compartment, but the officers were unable to
find them and Mr. McKnight refused to consent to a wider search of the car. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. McKnight also told the officers that the asking price of $1500.00 for the car seemed

1

a

good price, but the seller had all the

that the stolen plates came from his friend "Chris," who had
returned it with

I, p.3.) He
the car and

plates. (PSI, p.3.)

When the officers told Mr. McKnight that the car matched the description of one
used in two recent robberies, he reportedly stated that he and Ms. Minegar had to be
involved in the robbery because "Chris" had held a gun to their heads. (PSI, p.4.) The
officers arrested Mr. McKnight and booked him for grand theft by possession of stolen
property. 2 (PSI, p.4.)
In Kootenai County No. CR 2012-17453 (hereinafter, the possession of a stolen
vehicle

State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. McKnight had

committed the crime of possession of a stolen vehicle, felony, in violation of Idaho
Code§ 49-228.

(No. 41538 R., pp.34-35.) After Mr. McKnight waived his right to a

preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound him over to the district court.

(No. 41538

R., p.41.) He was released on his own recognizance. (No. 41538 R., p.41.) The State
then filed an Information charging him with the above offense. (No. 41538 R., pp.4445.) Mr. McKnight entered a written not guilty plea to the charge. (No. 41538 R., pp.4647.)

The PSI relates to both cases in this consolidated appeal.
The officers reportedly found stolen financial transaction cards, bank account
information, stolen wallets and identification cards, check blanks, and a printer with a
check blank in the tray in the car and under the porch where Ms. Minegar had been
seated. (PSI, p.4.) They also found a 2003 registration for the car, and a partially
written bill of sale in a black notebook belonging to Ms. Minegar. (PSI, p.4.) The
officers additionally found a white toy pistol, a baggie of Tramadol pills, a baggie of what
appeared to be marijuana residue, and a baggie of methamphetamine residue. (PSI,
p.4.) Further, they found sheets of paper with the names, birthdates, and Social
Security numbers of nine individuals. (PSI, p.4.)
1

2

2

Coeur d'Alene police
theft or unauthorized use of

with
Idaho Child

debit

Craycraft
(PSI,

told the

officers that when she went to sleep a couple days prior to speaking with the officers,
the card was inside her purse. (PSI, p.4.) At that time, Mr. McKnight was in her home
because Ms. Minegar babysat Ms. Craycraft's children.

(PSI, p.4.)

Later that day,

Ms. Craycraft's male roommate discovered several items missing from his room. (PSI,
p.4.) The next day, Ms. Craycraft confronted Mr. McKnight about the stolen items and
kicked him out of the residence after he returned the items.

(See PSI, p.4.) When

Ms. Craycraft checked the balance of her card, she discovered that there was no money
left in the account even though

child support had been deposited.

, p.4.) She

also found that the card had been used several times at a store and the store's ATM in
the early morning hours, even though the card was still in her purse. (PSI, p.4.) A total
of $316.17 had been withdrawn. (PSI, p.4.)
Ms. Craycraft suspected that Mr. McKnight had used the card and then returned
it to the purse. (PSI, p.4.) She reported that he would have known her PIN because
she had let him use her food stamp card, and both cards had the same PIN. (PSI, p.4.)
Ms. Craycraft also described the clothing Mr. McKnight had been wearing that day.
(PSI, p.4.) Video surveillance from the store showed that a male wearing the described
clothing had used the card at the store and ATM. (See PSI, p.4.) The clerk picked
Mr. McKnight out of a photo line-up and stated that he had purchased multiple scratch
tickets. (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. McKnight initially denied responsibility for the missing card, but after being
confronted with the evidence, he reportedly stated that did not remember taking the
card and that he might have been intoxicated at the time. (PSI, p.4.) When confronted
3

with having the

to

he

and use the card and then return it

told him

the

put the card back after she found it in his

pocket. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. McKnight was then arrested for grand theft and burglary. (PSI,
p.4.) He admitted to being out on his own recognizance for other theft-related charges.
(PSI, p.4.)
In Kootenai County No. CR 2012-19904 (hereinafter, the grand theft case), the
State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. McKnight had committed the crime of
grand theft, felony, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-2403(1) and 18-2407(1)(b).
R., pp.19-20.)

(No. 41537

After Mr. McKnight waived his right to a preliminary hearing, the

magistrate bound him over to the district court.

(No. 41537 R., p.27.) Mr. McKnight

entered a written not guilty plea to the charge. (No. 41537 R., pp.31-33.) The State
subsequently filed an Information charging him with felony grand theft, in violation of
1.C. § 18-2403(1 ). (No. 41537 R., pp.34-35.)
Mr. McKnight later entered into a plea agreement with the State, and agreed to
plead guilty in the possession of a stolen vehicle case and in the grand theft case. (No.
41537 R., p.36; No. 41538 R., p.49.) Mr. McKnight also agreed to waive his right to
appeal the conviction and sentence. (No. 41537 R., pp.36, 39; No. 41538 R., pp.49,
52.)

The State agreed to recommend a suspended sentence, a period of supervised

probation with local jail time, and a drug court screening if requested.

R., p.36; No. 41538 R., p.49.)

(No. 41537

The State also agreed to not file a possession of

methamphetamine charge in the possession of a stolen vehicle case, or a burglary
charge in the grand theft case. (No. 41537 R., p.36; No. 41538 R., p.49.)
The district court accepted Mr. McKnight's guilty pleas in both cases. (No. 41537

R., p.36; No. 41538 R., p.49.) The district court also ordered Mr. McKnight to undergo a
4

pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524.
1

)

McKnight was then

(No. 41537
on his own

No.
in the

grand theft case. (No. 41537 R., p.37; No. 41538 R., p.50.) However, Mr. McKnight did
not appear at his scheduled sentencing hearing for both cases.

( See No. 41537

R., p.46; No. 41538 R., p.58.) Additionally, Mr. McKnight did not attend his Section 19-

2524 mental health evaluation. (PSI, p.49.)
After being taken into custody, Mr. McKnight filed Motions to Withdraw Plea in
both cases. (No. 41537 R., pp.49-50; No. 41538 R., pp.61-62; see No. 41537 R., p.47;
No. 41538 R., p.59.)

The motions were made "on the grounds that the Defendant has

mental t1ealth issues and did not fully understand the consequences of the plea." (No.
41537 R., p.49; No. 41538 R., p.61.) Further, "Counsel for the Defendant has a difficult
time understanding the Defendant's communications and

receiving Defendant's

assistance in his own defense." (No. 41537 R., pp.49-50; No. 41538 R., pp.61-62.)
Thus, the motions stated that Mr. McKnight "needs to obtain a mental health evaluation,
follow the proscribed recommendation of the evaluator, including any medication
[regimen], and then proceed with this matter." (No. 41537 R., p.50; No. 41538 R., p.62.)
Mr. McKnight also filed motions in both cases requesting that the district court
order an I.C. § 18-211 examination. (No. 41537 R., pp.51-52; No. 41538 R., pp.63-64.)
The State agreed and stipulated to those motions, and the district court ordered a
Section 18-211 examination. (No. 41537 R., pp.53-56; No. 41538 R., pp.65-68.) The
district court kept the motions to withdraw plea "in abeyance." (No. 41537 R., p.53; No.
41538 R., p.65.)

The Section 18-211 evaluation found that Mr. McKnight was

competent to stand trial and fit to proceed. (PSI, pp.41-48.)

5

At the subsequent hearing on
in both cases,

motions to

McKnight's

raw Mr. McKnight's guilty

explained that

I.C. § 1

1"1

supplied the rationale for withdrawing the guilty pleas:
If you look at page 5 of the psych eval at the bottom, the last paragraph
there, it has the psychotic disorder. And it says, "Mr. McKnight does not
currently meet the criteria for psychotic disorder, but he may have met the
criteria for this diagnosis in the past." And that's what I'm talking about is
in the past. And it said, "For this reason consideration should be given to
diagnosis for substance-induced psychotic disorder." And I think that's
what he was going through when I met with him months ago and at the
time that he entered the pleas in this matter.
He's been in custody for quite some time now, and I think he's had
the opportunity to - to detox further. And so - and I don't think he's really
currently experiencing this, but I think at the time he was. And then
had an opportunity, he pied guilty, that he could get O.R.'ed, and I think
that's kind of what pushed him over the edge on - "Okay. I'll do it. I'll
plead." But now that his head is cleared, he wanted me to file this motion
to withdraw his plea.
(Tr., p.22, L.11 - p.23, L.5; see PSI, p.45.)
The State argued that good cause had not been demonstrated to allow
Mr. McKnight to withdraw his guilty pleas, and Mr. McKnight's counsel's opining that
Mr. McKnight may have had a diagnosis for a psychotic disorder was not evidence.
(Tr., p.23, Ls.15-25.) The State also noted that the motions to withdraw the guilty pleas
had been filed after the preparation of the presentence report. 3 (Tr., p.24, Ls.1-10.)
Additionally, the State argued that,

"because [Mr.

McKnight] has some

subsequent law violations, because he failed to appear for sentencing, the plea
agreement that was executed is no longer binding on the State." (Tr., p.24, Ls.11-14.)
The district court determined that the Section 18-211 evaluation indicated
Mr. McKnight was competent when he entered the guilty pleas and that Mr. McKnight

The PSI was filed on January 23, 2013. (PSI, p.1.) The motions to withdraw plea
were filed on May 7, 2013. (No. 41537 R., pp.49-50; No. 41538 R., pp.61-62.)
3

6

had not made the requisite increased showing of good cause to withdraw his pleas
(considering the motions to withdraw plea had been filed after the preparation of the
PSI), and thus denied the motions. (Tr., p.26, L.6- p.27, L.10.)
However, immediately after the district court denied the motions to withdraw the
guilty pleas, Mr. McKnight's counsel stated "for the record that Mr. McKnight had not
seen the presentence report. He had left the area, and I couldn't get ahold of him. He
wasn't even aware of the recommendation in the PSI." (Tr., p.27, Ls.14-18.)
At the sentencing hearing for both cases, the State recommended that the district
court impose a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed. (No. 41537 R., p.67;
No. 41538 R., p.79.)

Mr. McKnight recommended that the district court impose a

suspended unified sentence of four years, with one year fixed, and place him on
probation for a period of three years.

(No. 41537 R., p.68; No. 41538 R., p.80.)

Alternatively, Mr. McKnight recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction and
place him on a "rider." (No. 41537 R., p.68; No. 41538 R., p.80.) The district court, in
each case, imposed a concurrent unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed.
(No. 41537 R., p.68, 70-75; No. 41538 R., pp.80, 82-87.)
In each case, Mr. McKnight filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Judgment
and Sentence. (No. 41537 R., pp.76-78; No. 41538 R., pp.88-90.) The Idaho Supreme
Court later consolidated the appeals in both cases.
Granting Motion to Consolidate, Dec. 2, 2013.)

7

(Nos. 41537 & 41538, Order

ISSUE

its discretion when it den

8

motions to

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. McKnight's Motions To
Withdraw His Guilty Pleas
A.

Introduction
Mr. McKnight asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied

his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas, because he showed a just reason to withdraw
his pleas. Mr. McKnight showed a just reason to withdraw the guilty pleas because the
pleas were involuntary. The guilty pleas were involuntary because his mental health
issues left him unable to fully understand the consequences of the pleas.

Further,

permitting Mr. McKnight to withdraw his pleas would not have prejudiced the State.

8.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Laws
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) governs motions to withdraw a guilty plea.

"The

decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of the
district court, and such discretion should be liberally applied." State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho
219, 222 (2008). Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "is
limited to determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as
distinguished from arbitrary action." Id.
"[W]hen the motion is made before sentencing, a defendant need only show a
'just reason' to withdraw the plea." Id. (quoting I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho
799, 801 (1988)).

However, if the motion is made before sentencing but "after the

defendant has learned of the content of the PSI or has received other information about
the probable sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the
defendant's apparent motive." Id. (citing State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 64 7 (Ct. App.
2004 )).

A motion to withdraw plea will be denied if the State can show resulting
9

from the
motion

Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61 (2004 ).

even if

not prejudice the State, a motion to withdraw a

denied if the defendant has not presented and supported a "plausible reason for
withdrawal of the plea." State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 162 (Ct. App. 2003).
A defendant shows a just reason to withdraw a guilty p!ea if the plea was
involuntary.

See State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-36 (Ct. App. 2008).

"A

threshold question is whether the plea of guilty was knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily made." State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959 (Ct. App. 1990). Relief must
be granted if the plea is legally defective. Id. In other words, "[i]f a plea was not taken
in compliance with constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea
be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, then . . . 'just reason' will be
established as a matter of law." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333 (Ct. App. 2009).
"However, a constitutional defect in the plea is not necessary in order to show ... a 'just
reason."' Id. If the appellate court on review determines that the plea was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made, it then proceeds to determine whether any other "just
reason" exists for withdrawal of the plea. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959.
A court determines whether a guilty plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly
through a three-part inquiry involving:
(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to
confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself;
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of
pleading guilty.
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993).

"On appeal, Idaho law requires that

voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record
as a whole." Id.

10

The District Court Did Not Exercise Sound Judicial Discretion When It Required
An Increased Showing Of Good Cause
a preliminary matter, Mr. McKnight submits that
"sound judicial discretion," see Arthur, 145 Idaho at

district court
when it required an

increased showing of good cause because of the timing of the motions to withdraw plea.
Mr. McKnight was not subject to "an increased showing of good cause" (see Tr., p.26,
Ls.22-23), because he had not learned of the content of the PSI.
As discussed above, if a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made before
sentencing but "after the defendant has learned of the content of the PSI or has
other information about the probable sentence, the district court may temper its
liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive." Arthur, 145 Idaho at
While the motions to withdraw plea were filed after the preparation of the PSI
(see PSI, p.1; No. 41537 R., pp.49-50; No. 41538 R., pp.61-62), that does not establish

that Mr. McKnight learned of the content of the PSI. Rather, Mr. McKnight's counsel
indicated that "Mr. McKnight had not seen the presentence report. . . .

He wasn't even

aware of the recommendation in the PSI." (See Tr., p.27, Ls.14-18.) Thus, the district
court did not exercise sound judicial discretion when it required an increased showing of
good cause because of the timing of the motions to withdraw plea.

D.

Mr. McKnight Showed A Just Reason To Withdraw His Guilty Pleas Because The
Pleas Were Involuntary
Mr. McKnight asserts that he showed a just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas

because the pleas were involuntary. The district court in this case determined that the
requisite showing to withdraw the guilty pleas had not been made, because the
I.C. § 18-211 evaluation's finding that Mr. McKnight was competent supported the
conclusion that he was competent when he entered the pleas, the timing of the motions
11

to withdraw

(filed

the preparation of the

report) required an

McKnight

that the State was no longer

showing

bound by the plea agreement thanks to his failure to attend his scheduled sentencing.
(Tr., p.26, L.6- p.27, L.10.)
Despite those considerations, Mr. McKnight showed a just reason to withdraw his
pleas because the pleas were involuntary. See Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535-36. His
pleas were involuntary because his mental health issues left him unable to fully
understand the consequences of the pleas. See Dopp, 124 Idaho at 484.
Contrary to the district court's detE3rmination (see Tr., p.26, Ls.6-21 ), the
§ 18-211 evaluation suggests that Mr. McKnight was not competent to

the

guilty pleas because his mental health issues left him unable to understand the
consequences of pleading guilty.

The Section 1

11 evaluation indicates that

Mr. McKnight had mental health issues at the time he entered the guilty pleas, by
stating that "Mr. McKnight does not currently meet the criteria for psychotic disorder, but
he may have met the criteria for this diagnosis in the past." (See PSI, p.45.) "For this
reason, consideration should be given to diagnosis of Substance-Induced Psychotic
Disorder." (PSI, p.45.) Additionally, with respect to a diagnosis of bipolar disorder or
schizoaffective disorder, the Section 18-211 evaluation states that while "[t]here is some
speculation that Mr. McKnight may have Schizoaffective Disorder or some of Bipolar
Disorder ... I could not establish whether he meets the criteria for either in the past."
(PSI, p.45.) However, the evaluation also states that "there is a keyed-up, hyperactive
flavor in his presentation which suggests the possibility of a substance-induced disorder
which should be ruled out." (PSI, p.45.)

12

At the motion

hearing, Mr. McKnight's counsel told

court that he

district

was experiencing a

psychotic disorder when he met with Mr. McKnight and when Mr. McKnight entered the
pleas. (See Tr., p.22, L.22

p.23, L.1.) When Mr. McKnight's counsel first met with

Mr. McKnight, "He had just fairly recently been arrested.
methamphetamine,

I think,

pretty regularly,

[a]nd

He had been using

I was really having trouble

communicating with him." (Tr., p.21, Ls.20-23.) Mr. McKnight "was taking really fast
and mumbling and going this way and that way. I just couldn't really get[] him nailed
down [on] what he wanted to do, going
- p.22, L.2.)

and forth and back and forth." (Tr., p.21,

Similarly, the motions to withdraw the guilty pleas stated that

"Counsel for the Defendant has a difficult time understanding the Defendant's
communications and receiving Defendant's assistance in his own defense." (No. 41537
R., pp.49-50; No. 41538 R., pp.61-62.) Mr. McKnight's counsel's observations echo the
Section 18-211 evaluator's comments about Mr. McKnight's "keyed-up, hyperactive"
presentation, which suggested "the possibility of a substance-induced disorder .... "

(See PSI, p.45.) Thus, the Section 18-211 evaluation indicates that Mr. McKnight had
mental health issues at the time he entered the guilty pleas.
Mr. McKnight's mental health issues at the time he entered the guilty pleas left
him unable to understand the consequences of pleading guilty.

With respect to

Mr. McKnight's understanding of the situation at the time he entered the guilty pleas,
Mr. McKnight's counsel stated, "And then [Mr. McKnight] had an opportunity, [if] he pied
guilty, that he could get O.R.'ed, and I think that's kind of what pushed him over the
edge on-'Okay.

I'll do it, I'll plead."'

(Tr., p.23, Ls.1-4.)

He did that before "his

head ... cleared." (See Tr., p.23, L.4.) Mr. McKnight's focus on getting released on his
13

own recognizance, while he was apparently failing to consider
if

entered the pleas, indicates that he was u

incarceration
u

consequences of pleading guilty because of his mental health issues.

the
Dopp, 124

Idaho at 484. Thus, Mr. McKnight showed a just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas
because the pleas were involuntary. See Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535-36.

E.

Permitting Mr. McKnight To Withdraw His Pleas Would Not Have Prejudiced
The State
Mr. McKnight further asserts that permitting him to withdraw his guilty plea would

not have prejudiced the State.

If a defendant shows that a just reason exists for

withdrawing the plea, the State "may avoid the granting of the motion by demonstrating
that prejudice would result from withdrawal of the plea." Dopp, 124 Idaho
Here, the State did not demonstrate that prejudice would result from withdrawal
of Mr. McKnight's guilty pleas. (See Tr., p.23, L.15 - p.25, L.6.) Additionally, the district
court did not conclude that permitting Mr. McKnight to withdraw the pleas would
prejudice the State. (See Tr., p.25, L.21 - p.27, L.10.) Rather, the district court only
determined that Mr. Anderson had not shown that a just reason existed to withdraw his
pleas. (Tr., p. 27, Ls.8-10.) Thus, permitting Mr. McKnight to withdraw his pleas would
not have prejudiced the State.
Because Mr. McKnight's mental health issues left him unable to fully understand
the consequences of the guilty pleas, his pleas were involuntary. Because his pleas
were involuntary, Mr. McKnight showed a just reason to withdraw his pleas. Permitting
Mr. McKnight to withdraw his pleas would not have prejudiced the State.

Thus, the

district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. McKnight's motions to withdraw
his guilty pleas.

14

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. McKnight respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his judgments of conviction and remand his cases to the district court with direction to
grant his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.
DATED this 22 nd day of July, 2014.

P;J ~ ~ ~--BEN P~ MCGREEVY ~
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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